SignDrop Windows Zero-Day

No Fix, Public Exploit Code

Published 20 November 2026, 9 pages, Mitigata Threat Research

In plain words

A weakness in Windows lets someone who is already running code on a computer take over the whole machine. Working attack code is public, but Microsoft has no fix yet and no one has reported attacks with it. Keep the protective setting on, and limit who can run programs on shared computers, so a first foothold cannot become full control.

For business leaders

MSNightmare released working code for SignDrop, a Windows zero-day, on 10 November 2026. A standard user already running code on a machine can become SYSTEM, with no patch yet. No exploitation in the wild is reported. Ask IT which machines run Windows 11 25H2, 26H1 or Server 2025, and to keep CLFS authentication on, since disabling it reopens memory-corruption exploits. Ask IT to restrict code execution and logons on shared servers. Ask compliance which reporting duties apply, as CERT-In expects reports within 6 hours. Waiting leaves shared hosts exposed until Microsoft's next scheduled update on 8 December 2026.

For security analysts

SignDrop: local privilege escalation to SYSTEM via CLFS logfile authentication. Crafted log names a second container at an attacker-chosen path; Microsoft Defender (SYSTEM) opens it, creating a SYSTEM-owned file with user-controlled permissions. CWE-269, CWE-59 (analyst mapping). No CVE, CVSS or fix as of 16 Nov 2026; next scheduled update 8 Dec 2026. Exploit status: public proof of concept. Cyderes confirmed it; 78researchlab confirmed it works but judged it unreliable. No in-the-wild exploitation. Affected: Windows 11 25H2 and 26H1, Server 2025, updates from 28 Oct 2025, CLFS authentication active. Step 1: keep CLFS authentication on; disabling reopens memory-corruption exploits. Step 2: check Mode at HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication; 0 or 1 exposed, 2 or 3 disabled. Step 3: enforce App Control for Business or AppLocker on shared hosts. Step 4: enable the ASR rule blocking unproven executables. Step 5: restrict RDS and jump host logons. Detection: hid.dll in Common Files microsoft shared ink; SigDrop_ temp paths; .cnpf files not named *.blf.cnpf or not written by MsMpEng.exe; SYSTEM cmd, powershell or conhost under medium-integrity parent; Defender events 2001, 5001, 5013; silent sensors.

Key points

The full report is a PDF that opens with a work email.